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SHOULD CONTRIBUTORY CYBERSQUATTING BE ACTIONABLE?

Nicholas Foss Barbantonis*
Domain name registrars are increasingly targeted by
trademark owners for registering and hosting infringing domain
names, despite the lack of clear statutory authorization for these
claims. Registrars, pressed by reduced profit margins, have begun
offering value-added services such as sponsored domain parking
and WHOIS-masking. However, such services incentivize and aid
domain name purchasers to engage in infringement. Existing
scholarship on secondary liability in trademark law and
cybersquatting is scarce and outdated. This Article provides a
theoretical approach to the question of whether, and when,
contributory cybersquatting liability exists. The Article argues that
the relevant statute, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act (ACPA), was enacted against the backdrop of judicial
precedent and Congressional intent to enhance trademark
enforcement. By drawing upon the substantial case law
undergirding traditional contributory trademark infringement, the
Article contends that the motivations for including secondary
liability apply to ACPA as well.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
There is an ongoing controversy as to whether the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) includes a
cause of action for contributory cybersquatting for domain name
registrars.1 Contributory cybersquatting’s basic mechanism entails
an action to pursue cybersquatting caused by a third party’s bad
faith domain registration and subsequent use of another’s mark. It
is not the registrant (or the primary infringer) of the domain name
who is challenged. Instead, it is the domain name registrar. The
assertion of contributory liability is especially incentivized in the
realm of Internet domain names. 2 Given that the registrars
accounting for the majority of domain name registrations are
multi-million dollar corporations, judgments against registrars,
contrary to those against individual defendants, will also be easier
to enforce.3
Several earlier district court decisions have held both implicitly
and explicitly that such an action is available. 4 However, the
situation took a dramatic turn in Petroliam Nasional Berhad v.

1

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012). A registrar is responsible for maintaining
the registry, and is the actor that potential purchasers of domain names
(registrants) contacts to reserve domain names. Examples of major registrars are
Godaddy.com and domain.com.
2
This is because the potential efficiency of pursuing relief by a domain name
registrar is much greater since they are generally easier to locate. This is
discussed further infra Part II.D.
3
Michael J. De La Merced, As I.P.O. Nears, GoDaddy Tries to Show It’s
More Than Just Domain Names, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/as-i-p-o-nears-godaddy-tries-to-show-it
s-more-than-just-domain-names/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (finding that
GoDaddy.com, one of the leading registrars, reported $658.7 million in revenue
for the first six months of 2014).
4
E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.Com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D.
Mich. 2001); Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D.
Cal. 2009); Microsoft Corp. v. Shah, No. C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL 108954
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011); Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Above.com Pty, Ltd., 881 F.
Supp. 2d 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
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GoDaddy.com, Inc.,5 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded the opposite—the cause of action does not exist.6
The issue regarding the actionability of contributory
cybersquatting liability is not new. The issue has, however,
become more critical as a result of the ever-changing registrar
market conditions. This is especially true when considering the
historical surge in domain name registrations and the prognosis of
an ever-increasing poll of new top-level domain names (TLD)
introduced by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN).7 Although the domain registration business is
a multi-billion dollar industry, profit margins are shrinking due to
fierce competition among the registrars.8 In order to maximize
profit, several registrars have started to offer services outside of the
core functions—registering and maintaining domain names. This
Article focuses on registrar services such as sponsored domain
parking and WHOIS-masking. 9 Both services are generally
considered to be outside of registrar functions such as registering
and maintaining domain names. Insightful scholarship is scarce

5

737 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, No. 13-1255, 2014 WL 1496428
(U.S. Oct. 6, 2014).
6
Id. at 548.
7
What Does ICANN Do?, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/
what-2012-02-25-en (last visited Aug.17, 2015); see New Generic Top-Level
Domains
Announcements,
ICANN,
http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/
announcements-and-media/latest (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
8
VeriSign’s Renewal Rates Improve For Q2 2015, TREFIS (July 24, 2015),
http://www.trefis.com/stock/vrsn/articles/307215/verisigns-renewal-rates-impro
ve-for-q2-2015-while-it-plans-rollout-of-new-idns-and-a-fresh-round-of-price-hi
ke-for-net/2015-07-24; Brian Wu, GoDaddy Stock: GDDY Is Growing Like a
Weed, But . . . , INVESTORPLACE (Aug. 6, 2015), http://investorplace.com/2015/
08/godaddy-stock-gddy-is-growing-like-a-weed-but/#.VdHuErKqpBc.
9
See infra Part II.B for an explanation of the services. Although several other
services exist with categories arguably outside of “core functions,” this Article
will primarily focus on the services: domain parking and WHOIS-masking.
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and primarily deals with the outdated juridical landscape prior to
the Ninth Circuit Petroliam decision.10
This Article seeks to revisit the prior decisions and investigate
whether contributory cybersquatting is constitutional. Although the
Ninth Circuit is a heavy authority on intellectual property law, it is
important to remember that the United States Supreme Court has
never discussed the issue. This Article concludes that there should
be a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting for domain
name registrars.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The Internet
The International Telecommunication Union reports that the
Internet currently has 3.2 billion users—about 44% of the total
world population.11 There are currently a staggering 294 million
active TLD registrations.12 Registrations have increased by 6.6%
in the past years,13 making evident the domain names’ value and
ever-increasing integral part of modern business and social life.
Few could have anticipated such immense development. The
considerable registration statistics do, however, have a backside.
Indeed, it increases the potential for dispute between mark owners
and cybersquatters. It all started in the mid-1980s when scientists
10

Christine A. Walczak, The New and Evolving Tort of Contributory
Cybersquatting: Did the Courts Get It Right?, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
531 (2012) (discussing why contributory cybersquatting has no statutory basis
and as such is not actionable); Kurt M. Saunders, Is Contributory
Cybersquatting the Next Front in Domain Name Litigation?, PENN. B. ASS’N,
INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL., Spring 2011; Darryl C. Wilson, Battle Galactica:
Recent Advances and Retreats in the Struggle for the Preservation of Trademark
Rights on the Internet, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 23–24 (2011); Advising e Bus.
§ 6:49.
11
ICT Facts & Figures, ICT, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/
Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2015.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
12
The Domain Name Industry Brief, VERISIGN, Vol. 12, Issue 2, June 2015,
available at https://www.verisign.com/assets/domain-name-report-june2015.pdf.
13
Id.
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developed the Internet Protocol Suite (“TCP/IP”), which allowed
computers to communicate across networks over vast geographical
distances.14 With the implementation of TCP/IP, every computer
connected to the network now had a unique, either statically or
dynamically, Internet Protocol (“IP”) address.15
For communication to flow between two or more computers,
one needs to know the recipient’s IP address. The vast majority of
servers visited by regular web-surfers have an assigned static IP
address. This system is very similar to our current telephone
system. As most individuals born before the 1990s can recall, it
may be cumbersome to remember or bookmark every IP address. It
is also challenging for corporations to market a particular brand
through an IP address. This is further complicated by the fact that a
given website IP may change for various reasons including
switching between hosting companies. Corporations with large
online presence, such as Google.com, Facebook.com, etc., cannot
rely on a single server, however powerful, as it will not able to
process all requests simultaneously. This issue is exacerbated by
larger distances and increasing latency, inhibiting the consumers’
experience.
To counter these issues, enterprises utilize a system that links
several hundred servers all over the world to balance server load
and delay. This would not have been practically possible without
the Domain Name System (“DNS”). A DNS attaches a domain
name to IP addresses. This gives two great advantages: the user no
14

Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society,
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-histo
ry-internet (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
15
The current main protocol, which is called IPv4, is an address containing a
series of four numbers separated by decimals, i.e. 100.101.201.1. Initially the
circa 4.3 billion addresses under the IPv4 (32-bit numeric address), which
during its infancy seemed like a generous amount, are actually starting to run
out. To counter this, the new IPv6 (128-bit hexadecimal numeric address), is
currently being rolled out. In comparison, the new protocol has 2128, or circa 340
trillion
combinations.
An
IPv6
address
looks
like
this:
3ffe:1900:4535:2:200:f8ff:fe21:57cf.
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longer needs to know the IP address; and the host is no longer
bound by a single IP address—it can simply update the connected
IP addresses to the domain name. In today’s society, being readily
available on the Internet is invaluable to any business. However, as
will be discussed below, the advent of the domain name has also
created the issue of people utilizing domain names that are similar
to the trademarks of recognizable businesses with the aim of
making an easy profit and owners of various marks
(“cybersquatting”).
B. Cyberpiracy
Cyberpiracy is an umbrella term primarily covering
cybersquatting and typosquatting. Cybersquatting is “the bad faith
registration of domain names with intent to profit from the
goodwill associated with the trademarks of another.” 16
Traditionally, a cybersquatter would speculate by wrongfully
registering several domains in the hope that they could receive a
larger sum from the true mark holder to gain ownership of it.
Typosquatting is a newer phenomenon, where the registrant
registers multiple domains that misspell various marks in the hope
that unknowing web surfers will enter their sites and generate
traffic, either to sell their own infringing products or to front
various advertisements of third party competing or infringing
products and earn a given amount per click accumulated.17 An
example of typosquatting would be aple.com, instead of
apple.com. For both types of cyberpiracy, squatters have been
found to misuse the marks’ accumulated goodwill by diluting or
tarnishing the mark by redirecting traffic to sites selling infringing
goods or services and adult or obscene third party websites. In any
case, the mere act of denying the trademark owner use of the
16

Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 911, 915 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
(quoting Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1099 (C.D.
Cal. 2009)).
17
Christopher G. Clark, The Truth in Domain Names Act of 2003 and A
Preventative Measure to Combat Typosquatting, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1476,
1488 (2004).
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domain name in today’s society of e-trading may seriously impact
the rightful owner’s ability to succeed.
The ACPA, which was passed as an amendment to the Lanham
Act in 1999,18 protects U.S. marks that are either registered with
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), or that
are distinctive or famous.19 The statute requires the plaintiff to
prove the domain name is identical or confusingly similar
(dilution) and that the registrant has the “bad faith intent to profit
from that mark.”20 The statute seeks to minimize shortcomings of
the Lanham Act’s general trademark provisions, which requires the
infringing use to be “in commerce.”21 The ACPA also intended to
explain the shortcomings of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(“FTDA”), which one commentator argued was a “circus among
the circuits” as some circuits required marks to be nationally
renowned, while some only required niche market fame, and some
required actual dilutive harm.22 In 2003, the Supreme Court in
Mosely v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. held that there was a
requirement of actual confusion.23 Moseley was finally superseded
in 2006 by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”), which
amended the Lanham Act to require only a likelihood of
confusion.24
To vindicate a claim under the ACPA, it is no longer required
that the mark be both distinctive and famous to be protected.25 The
18

15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2012).
Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (Both unregistered distinctive and famous marks are
protected when considered recognized common law marks.).
20
Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
21
Id. § 1114(1)(a).
22
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Blame It On the Cybersquatters: How Congress
Partially Ends the Circus Among the Circuits with the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J., 777, 777–813 (2001).
23
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
24
Trademark Dilution Revision Act Of 2006, Pub. L. No 109–312, 120 Stat.
1730 (2006).
25
In 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A), the statute states:
[W]ithout regard to the goods or services of the parties that person—
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from . . . [a] mark . . . ; and
19
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plaintiff is also not required to show actual dilution or a likelihood
of dilution. 26 Instead, the ACPA’s main function is to protect
against “bad faith intent to profit.” 27 When determining “bad
faith,” the statute lists a non-exclusive nine-factor list:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if
any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of
the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that
person;
(III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection
with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a
site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s
online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could
harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain
or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a
likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without
having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona
fide offering of any goods or services, or the person’s prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person’s provision of material and misleading false contact
information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the
person’s intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or
the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;

26
27

(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that—
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration
of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to
or dilutive of that mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section
706 of title 18 [the Red Cross] or section 220506 of title 36 [the
Olympics].
Id.
Id.
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(VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of
others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain
names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the
time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods
or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person’s domain
name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning
of subsection (c) of this section [Dilution by blurring; dilution by
tarnishment].28

The factors fall in two groups in which the first four suggest a
lack of bad faith, and the last five are indicia of bad faith intent.29
Not being able to find goodwill is not necessarily an indication of
bad faith, and finding goodwill is not necessarily an indication of
the opposite.30 The statute also has a safe harbor, which limits
liability where “the court determines that the person believed and
had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name
was a fair use or otherwise lawful.”31
Mark owners often face the challenge of a person registering
identical or confusingly similar domain names. Excluding the
hardship of regular trademark litigation, the challenge is two-fold.
First, locating the registrant can be challenging because the
database containing information about the registrants of domain
names, the WHOIS records, 32 is often masked. A “masked”
WHOIS is usually a legitimate registration by a proxy acting as an
agent for the registrant to preserve the registrants’ anonymity
28

Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
H.R. REP. 106-412 at 10 (1999); Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt.,
Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 498 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e are not limited to considering just
the listed factors when making our determination of whether the statutory
criterion has been met. The factors are, instead, expressly described as indicia
that ‘may’ be considered along with other facts.”).
30
S. REP. 106-140 at 8 (1999).
31
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
32
WHOIS is a searchable database that lists all current domain name
registrations. The database contains information such as the registrants’ contact
information, and the date of registration and expiration.
29
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against spam. GoDaddy.com is one of many registrars that offer
this service. They will register the registrant’s information on a
confidential database and put generic information on the public
WHOIS database.33 GoDaddy.com now requires third parties to
provide affidavits or court orders to reveal the registrant’s real
information. 34 The WHOIS records are also often inaccurate,
because registrars are not obligated to investigate the truthfulness
of registrants’ information when receiving applications for domain
names. Although some registrars implement so-called “click-wrap”
terms of service requiring the registrant “to keep . . . [the WHOIS]
information in a current and accurate status”,35 the practical reality
is that it is sufficient to provide falsified information such as name,
telephone number, and address along with a valid credit card
number, which anyone can buy anonymously. This gives
cybersquatters the opportunity to provide false information and
hide their identities.
Second, owners of famous marks in particular are prone to
cybersquatting from multiple squatters who each register several
domain names. Such scenarios force plaintiffs to file multiple suits
against several different cybersquatters. This is both
time-consuming and expensive.
C. Secondary Liability
The Lanham Act does not expressly mention secondary
liability for trademark infringement. 36 Secondary liability
comprises both participant-based and relationship-based liability
33

See GoDaddy.com, https://www.godaddy.com/domainaddon/private
-registration.aspx?ci=92976 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (offering WHOIS
masking for an annual fee of $7.99 per year per registered domain name).
34
See
GoDaddy.com’s
Domain
Name
Proxy
Agreement,
http://www.godaddy.com/agreements/showdoc.aspx?pageid=DOMAIN_NAME
PROXY (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
35
See
GoDaddy.com
Domain
Name
Registration
Agreement,
https://www.godaddy.com/agreements/showdoc.aspx?pageid=REG_SA&isc=cj
c1hos1 (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
36
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
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and is a purely court-created doctrine based on principles of
secondary liability in tort cases.37
Participant-based infringement refers to conduct in which the
primary infringer’s injurious behavior is induced, contributed to, or
facilitated by a secondary infringer.38 The main aspect of such
claims is usually tied to the secondary infringer’s knowledge or
lack thereof, and to the level of active harmful contribution. 39
Relationship-based liability is based on the principle of respondeat
superior and focuses on the defendant’s control and accrued
benefits due to the harm caused by the primary infringer.40 If the
relationship between the defendants is close enough, courts will
treat them as one.41 This Article will focus on participant-based
liability, also known as contributory liability.
The landmark case for contributory infringement liability is
Inwood v. Ives.42 The case involved a generic drug, which the

37

See Inwood Labs. Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Secondary Liability for Online Trademark
Infringement: The International Landscape, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 463, 463
(2014).
39
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26 (1995) (stating “(1)
One who, on behalf of a third person, reproduces or imitates the trademark, trade
name, collective mark, or certification mark of another on goods, labels,
packaging, advertisements, or other materials that are used by the third person in
a manner that subjects the third person to liability to the other for infringement
under the rule stated in § 20 is subject to liability to that other for contributory
infringement; (2) If an actor subject to contributory liability under the rule stated
in Subsection (1) acted without knowledge that the reproduction or imitation
was intended by the third person to confuse or deceive, the actor is subject only
to appropriate injunctive relief.”).
40
Dinwoodie, supra note 38; Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 317 F.3d
1121 (10th Cir. 2003).
41
Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services., Inc., 955 F.2d
1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating vicarious liability requires the infringer and
defendant to have “apparent or actual partnership” and to have “authority to bind
one another in transactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership or
control over the infringing product”).
42
456 U.S. 844 (1982).
38
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defendant manufacturer sold through third party pharmacists. 43
While some of the pharmacists committed primary infringement by
selling the drug as the branded version, the plaintiff chose to
pursue the generic drug manufacturer for contributory
infringement.44 The U.S. Supreme Court held that:
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.45

The Inwood test is two-fold. First, one must find intentional
inducement, and second, one must find a continued supply of the
product, which the petitioners knew were infringing.46 The first
prong is relatively uncomplicated as it simply includes an analysis
of whether or not there is intentional infringement. The second
prong, however, is less obvious. The second prong was elaborated
in Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc.47
The case involved counterfeit Hard Rock Café t-shirts, sold by
various vendors at a flea market, and whether the flea market could
be held contributorily liable for allowing such practice. 48 The
court’s conclusion was that the flea market could be held liable if
“willfully blind” to the trademark infringement conducted by the
vendors. 49 The court explained that “[i]n the absence of any
suggestion that a trademark violation should not be treated as a
common law tort” the flea market was “responsible for the torts of
those it permits on its premises.”50 The question becomes whether

43

Id.
Id. at 849.
45
Id. at 854.
46
Id. at 855.
47
955 F.2d 1143, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1992).
48
Id. at 1145–46.
49
Id. at 1149.
50
Id.
44
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the owner of the premises “know[s] or ha[s] reason to know that
the other is acting or will act tortiously.”51
The flea market analysis was further expanded in Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.52 to also include services.
The question then becomes whether the defendant has created a
marketplace where infringement occurs and the degree of control
and monitoring exercised. 53 The court must also “consider the
extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third party’s
means of infringement,”54 and under this theory “a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant had knowledge and ‘[d]irect control and
monitoring of the instrumentality used by the third party to infringe
the plaintiff’s mark.’”55
With over twenty years of decisions finding contributory
trademark infringement with no intervention by Congress, it is safe
to conclude that contributory trademark infringement is settled law
in the United States.56
D. Secondary Liability Applied to Domain Names: Contributory
Cybersquatting
Applied to the realm of the internet, the possible advantages of
secondary liability can be significant. Unlike in traditional
trademark litigation where there is usually one or a few domestic
51

Id.
194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
53
Id. at 984.
54
Id.; Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F.Supp.2d
1098, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
55
Louis Vuitton, 591 F.Supp.2d at 1111 (quoting Lockheed Martin I, 194 F.3d
at 984).
56
See Coach, Inc. v. Swap Shop, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278 (S.D. Fla.
2012) (providing a clear picture of the state of the availability of contributory
trademark infringement liability); see also Inwood Labs., Inc. 456 U.S. at 853–
55; Coach, Inc. v. Gata Corp., 2011 WL 2358671, at *6 (D.N.H. June 9, 2011);
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007);
Adidas America, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 2007 WL 2915594 (D.Or. Oct. 3, 2007);
Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1150; Coach, Inc. v. D & N Clothing, Inc., 2011
WL 2682969 (E.D.Mich. July 11, 2011).
52
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defendants per case, the number of different registrants of similar
domain names of any famous trademark might be in the hundreds
and from all over the world. Registrants with masked or fake
WHOIS data further complicate the matter.
The benefits of allowing secondary liability is not restricted to
the direct effects of each case because it also serves as an incentive
for actors such as registrars to partake more actively in the cost
associated with monitoring and enforcement of infringement. That
said, if both pre-screening and subsequent response to trademark
notices are reasonable, registrars should not run the risk of
liability.57 There is nothing preventing registrars from conducting
shallow domain and trademark searches to identify potential
infringement. This may largely be automated by creating a script
where the sought-after domain name is queried against national
and international trademark databases. If the script detects possible
infringement, it could be forwarded to a caseworker to make a
preliminary determination of bad faith. Of course, this would
induce an additional cost. Today’s dot-com domain name prices
usually hover around $10 for the first year, and between $10 and
$20 for each subsequent year.58 The price increase would likely be
nominal and easily transferred to the consumers. If anything, the
increased registration fee would function as an augmented
threshold against cybersquatting.
It is important to note the statements above clearly contradict
the ACPA’s current safe harbor provision contained in
§ 1114(2)(D). The provision shields registrars from monetary
57

Stacey L. Dogan, Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion: A Tale of
Two Approaches to Intermediary Trademark Liability Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 503 (2014).
58
Domain.com, https://www.domain.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (showing
the price to register a new dot com domain was $9.99 with a subsequent yearly
price of $11.49 per year); see also GODADDY.COM, https://www.godaddy.com/
(last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (showing the price to register a new dot com was
$2.99 per year with a minimum two year agreement with subsequent yearly
price of $15 per year).
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liability from certain registrar core actions. 59 As we will see
below, there are multiple scenarios where the specific actions of a
registrar may indeed render the provision irrelevant.60 In clauses
(ii) and (iii), the provision explicitly lists actions—including
refusing to register, removing from registration, transferring,
temporarily disabling, or permanently canceling a domain name in
in compliance with a court order—that, if taken by the registrar
would shield those entities from monetary liability. 61 The
legislative history states that this was indented to “encourage[]
domain name registrars and registries to work with trademark
owners to prevent cybersquatting.”62
As with traditional trademark infringement under the Lanham
Act, the ACPA has no specific mention of contributory liability.63
However, there are several cases, which deal with the theory.64
III.

ANALYSIS OF CASES PRIOR TO PETROLIAM NASIONAL
BERHAD V. GODADDY.COM
This section discusses the several district court cases leading
up to the Ninth Circuit decision in Petroliam Nasional Berhad v.
GoDaddy.com.65

59

15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D).
See e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp.
2d 648 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (stating registrars are only immunized by liability
when acting as a registrar, i.e., registering domain names for registrants).
61
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(i)(II) (exempting from liability “any action of
refusing to register, removing from registration, transferring, temporarily
disabling, or permanently canceling a domain name- (I) in compliance with a
court order under section 1125(d) of this title; or (II) in the implementation of a
reasonable policy by such registrar, registry, or authority prohibiting the
registration of a domain name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or
dilutive of another’s mark.”).
62
See S. REP. No. 106–40, at 11 (1999).
63
15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
64
See supra note 4.
65
Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, 737 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2013).
60
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A. Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc.66
This case involved a defendant website, Greatdomains.com,
which specialized in domain name auctions.67 Greatdomains.com
profited from commissions on sales conducted through its site.68
The source of the controversy was a handful of domain names that
included trademarks held by Ford. 69 Instead of pursuing the
registrant, Ford sued Greatdomains.com for contributory
cybersquatting under the flea market analysis theory, as
Greatdomains.com had created the “necessary marketplace,”
analogous to the Lockheed Martin Corp. case.70
The court agreed that the flea market analysis could be applied
to allegations of cybersquatting, but the court decided upon a
heightened standard because, as the “ACPA requires a showing of
‘bad faith intent’—a subjective element not required under
traditional infringement, unfair competition, or dilution claims
. . . .”71 The U.S District Court for the Eastern District Court of
Michigan concluded that it would not be sufficient for a registrar to
“merely [be] aware that domain names identical or similar to
protected marks were being sold over its website.”72 This is based
on ACPA’s safe harbor provision of non-bad faith uses, and unless
the registrar “knew or should have known” of the registrants’
illegitimate reasons for registering the domain in the first place, the
registrar should not be held liable. 73 Thus, the court required
“exceptional circumstances” for contributory liability to apply,
because registrars “could not be expected to ascertain the good or
bad faith intent of its vendors . . . .”74
66

177 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
Id.
68
Id. at 646.
69
Id. at 635 (finding three domains created a high likelihood of confusion:
4fordtrucks.com, 4fordparts.com, and lincolntrucks.com).
70
Id. at 646.
71
Id. at 647.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
67
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In Ford Motor Co. the court did not find “exceptional
circumstances,” and dismissed Ford’s claim of contributory
cybersquatting.75
B. Solid Host v. Namecheap, Inc.76
This case relates to a Dutch plaintiff, Solid Host, that lost
control of its domain name, solidhost.com, after its registrar,
eNom, had a security breach and a third party gained control of the
domain and subsequently moved the domain to another account.77
All traffic to the domain name was redirected to a temporary site
claiming the domain was for sale.78 The temporary site listed an
email address for information, and upon sending a domain transfer
request, Solid Host sent a reply with a demand of $12,000. Solid
Host claimed that defendant Namecheap, Inc. (“Namecheap”)
should be contributorily liable, as it provided the service
“WhoisGuard,” which listed Namecheap as the registrant, allowing
the hijacker to remain anonymous.79
Namecheap had refused to reveal its customer’s identity, even
when provided with sworn affidavits by Solid Host’s owner,
reasoning they wanted to “remain neutral,” and that the dispute
was between Solid Host and the anonymous third party.80
The court made clear that this case is not a typical
cybersquatting case—in which the cybersquatter registers the
domain name of a well-known trademark as a speculation—but
squatting by hacking.81 Both types of cybersquatting, however,
entail an effort by the squatter to ransom the domain name.82
75

Id.
652 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
77
Id. at 1096–97
78
Id. at 1097.
79
Id. at 1096–97.
80
Id. at 1098 (stating Namecheap eventually revealed the identity after
receiving a court order directing them to cooperate with eNom to transfer the
domain name to Solid Host).
81
Id. at 1102.
82
Id.
76
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In determining contributory liability, the court looked to Ford
Motor Co. 83 The three primary questions were (1) whether
Namecheap sufficiently monitored and controlled the service; (2)
whether Namecheap knew of the cybersquatting and; (3) whether
the customer was doing so with bad faith intent to profit from the
Solid Host mark.84 As to the first requirement, the court answered
affirmatively, reasoning that the anonymity service “was central to
Doe’s cybersquatting scheme,” and “[i]f NameCheap had returned
the domain name to Solid Host, Doe’s illegal activity would have
ceased.”85 As for the second requirement, the court stated that in
Namecheap’s inherently difficult position, as a registrar,
Namecheap could not be expected to monitor the Internet to
ascertain a customer’s good or bad faith and, “that ‘exceptional
circumstances’ must be shown to prove the degree of knowledge
required to impose contributory liability for cybersquatting.” 86
Because Solid Host’s owners offered affidavits for the facts, the
court did not accept Namecheap’s motion to dismiss. Thus, the
court recognized the applicability of a cause of action for
contributory cybersquatting, as the information provided probably
“would have led a normal and prudent person to conclude that the
domain it registered had been stolen.”87
C. Microsoft Corp. v. Shah88
Like in Ford Motor Co., the defendants in Microsoft Corp.
registered domains containing plaintiff’s trademarks to divert
traffic to their website. 89 However, unlike in Ford Motor Co.
where inducement was not an issue, the defendants in Microsoft
Corp. also actively provided instructions to customers on how to
83

Id. at 1112, 1115; Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.Com, 177 F. Supp. 2d
635, 646 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
84
Solid Host, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1115–16.
85
Id.
86
Id. (citing Ford Motor Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 647).
87
Id. at 1116.
88
C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL 108954 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011).
89
Id. at *2.
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mislead consumers to enter their sites and to use Microsoft logos
without authorization.90 Defendants also sold an emoticon-related
software that incorporated Microsoft marks.91 The defendants did
not “simply provide a marketplace where a trade in domain names
may take place, as was the case in” Ford Motor Co.92 Rather, the
defendants developed and marketed a method, of which “the sole
purpose . . . was to allow purchasers to profit from the illicit use of
Microsoft marks” by misleading web-surfers to think that they
were browsing the sites of authorized Microsoft retailers. 93
Interestingly, the court in Microsoft Corp. relied on both the “flea
market” model set forth in Ford Motor Co., and Solid Host, in
addition to traditional trademark principles for contributory
trademark dilution as used in Inwood.94
In analyzing the ACPA, the court found Shah’s conduct to fall
“squarely within the statute’s goal of imposing liability on those
who seek to profit in bad faith by means of registering, trafficking,
or using domain names that contain identical or confusingly
similar marks.”95 The defendants’ conduct of selling a method that
teaches third parties about how to infringe on the core rights,
against which the ACPA was enacted to protect, “should not be
able to escape liability by interpreting the statute so narrowly.”96
Finally, the court relied on Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, which
makes clear that “it is a well-established canon of statutory
construction that a court should go beyond the literal language of a
statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose
of the statute.”97
90

Id.
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at *3.
94
Id. at *2 (referencing a similar case, Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,
76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
95
Id. at *3.
96
Id.
97
Id. at *3 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586
(1983)).
91
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The court found that the defendants could not hide behind the
protection of blindness to the bad faith reasons behind the sales of
the product. 98 Because Microsoft Corp. dealt with a markedly
more aggressive behavior—developing and marketing a tool
helping its customers to infringe on the Microsoft marks through
its marketplace—the defendants’ conduct satisfied the elevated bad
faith standard from Ford Motor Co. as the “cyber-landlord” had
reason to know that its “vendors [were] utilizing the marketplace
for domain names” with no “legitimate purpose.”99
In finding contributory infringement, the court took a more
cautious road than previous courts and relied on the Ninth Circuit
decision, DSPT International v. Nahum.100 The defendant in DSPT
used the plaintiff’s mark to gain an advantage in bargaining for
money that was arguably owed to him.101 The court held that even
though the ACPA was enacted to stop cybersquatters registering
hundreds of domain names, the statute “is written more broadly
than what may have been the political catalyst that got it passed.”102
Thus, the court interpreted the Act broadly to include such bad
faith use.
D. Verizon California, Inc. v. Above.com103
Above.com, an ICANN accredited domain name registrar,104
offered (and still offers) so-called WHOIS privacy services and

98

Id.
Id. at *2.
100
Id. at *3 (citing DSPT International v. Nahum, No. 08–55062 2010 WL
4227883 *3 (9th Cir. Oct 27, 2010) (holding that defendant had used plaintiff’s
mark to gain leverage in bargaining for money that someone arguably owed to
him)).
101
Id. at *8.
102
Id. (quoting DSPT International, No. 08–55062 at *3).
103
Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Above.com Pty, Ltd., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
104
See How to Become a Registrar, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/
resources/pages/accreditation-2012-02-25-en (last visited April 15, 2015).
99
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domain parking services.105 Ten unknown “John Does” registered
over a hundred domain name variants and typographically
erroneous106—yet similar—domain names to Verizon and other
famous-mark holders through Above.com.107 Although it is clear
that a registrar cannot be held liable for merely registering domain
names, 108 the offering of WHOIS privacy and domain
parking—both of which increased Above.com income per domain
name—incentivized the registrants to register domain names with
bad faith intent to profit to generate domain names similar to
famous marks. The reason for this is that the parked sites display
various related advertisements, which in turn pay a certain amount
per click to the registrant. In short, the similar domain name lures
unknowing consumers to the site, which generates traffic and
subsequent clicks.
Because the court found that a registrar’s registration of a
domain name implicates a service, it relied on Lockheed Martin
Corp.’s extent of control and monitoring of the instrumentality
used by the Does to infringe on the marks.109 It further agreed with
Ford Motor Co. and Solid Host that bad faith intent to profit must
be demonstrated by the existence of exceptional circumstances.110
As direct liability had been properly alleged for the domain names
105

Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
This practice is also known as “Typo-squatting.”
107
Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at n.2. The court found that
“Defendants have registered ‘‘www.ver9izon.com,’’ ‘‘www.veri9zon.com,’’and
‘‘www.verizo9n.com.’’ On a standard computer keyboard, the ‘‘9’’ key
straddles the ‘‘i’’ and ‘‘o’’ keys; thus, a consumer might mistakenly hit the ‘‘9’’
while typing in ‘‘www.verizon.com’’ and inadvertently visit one of Defendants’
sites, rather than Verizon’s.” Id. at n.1.
108
See id.
109
Id. at 1180 (quoting Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999)).
110
Id.; Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.Com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647 (E.D.
Mich. 2001); see also Solid Host v. Namecheap Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092,
1116 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding “‘exceptional circumstances’ must be shown to
prove the degree of knowledge required to impose contributory liability for
cybersquatting”).
106
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in question, the case turned on whether the facts presented
“plausibly demonstrate the exceptional circumstances necessary to
show that the defendants knew or should have known that the
registrants were violating the ACPA in bad faith.” 111 The
defendants both controlled and monitored the privacy and parking
services, and knew that the services were used to cybersquat on
plaintiff’s famous marks. 112 Furthermore, both services clearly
incentivize registrants to cybersquat, who “should have been
aware” that they could be used for cybersquatting.113 Further, the
service had already been subject to “nearly 200 UDRP
cybersquatting complaints.”114
In determining the availability of ACPA contributory
cybersquatting liability, the court looked to all three previously
mentioned cases, all of which either expressly confirmed the
existence of such an action, or at least suggested that contributory
liability may exist. 115 Unlike the previous cases, the court in
Verizon California made an effort to mention the most
fundamental step in any legal analysis, which is always to “look to

111

Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.; see § 4 Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (1999),
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-2012-02-25-en (UDRP is a
mandatory administrative proceeding for all gTLD, and some ccTLD disputes
for complaints regarding domain registrations that “(i) . . . is identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has
rights;” and the registrant has (ii) “no rights or legitimate interests in respect of
the domain,” and (iii) the domain “has been registered and is being used in bad
faith.”); see, e.g., WIPO Guide to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide/#a1
(UDRP proceedings are generally faster and more inexpensive than regular
procedure).
115
See Microsoft Corp. v. Shah, No. C10–0653 RSM, 2011 WL 108954, at
*1–*3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011); Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F.
Supp. 2d 1092, 1111–17 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Ford Motor Co. v.
Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 646–47 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
112
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the statute’s text.”116 The court reiterated that the ACPA does not
“expressly [recognize] nor expressly prohibit . . . claim[s] for
contributory cybersquatting.” 117 Contributory liability for
trademark infringement already existed and continues to exist, and
like under the ACPA, is a purely judicially created doctrine
derived from the common law of torts.118 As such, the court based
its further discussion on the Supreme Court case United States v.
Texas, 119 which held that it is presumed that when a statute
“invade[s] the common law[, to] ‘favor . . . the retention of
long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident.’”120 The court concluded that
“[a]gainst this backdrop, Congress codified the ACPA as an
extension of trademark law because the problems created by
cybersquatting did not fit neatly into traditional trademark
principles.”121
The ACPA was introduced with the aim of combating
cybersquatters operating outside the realm of commerce. The court
concluded that Congress must have been aware of the contributory
trademark infringement standards set in common law, and without
an “expressed legislative desire to the contrary, the ACPA carried
forward traditional common law principles attendant to trademark
rights.”122 It did not matter, for the sake of applying contributory
liability, that the ACPA (unlike the Lanham Act) requires proof of
bad faith intent to profit.123 Requiring such proof automatically
116

Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (citing Hawaii v. Office of
Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 173–75 (2009)).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 1177 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 104 (2d
Cir. 2010)).
119
Id. (quoting U.S. v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)).
120
Id. at 1176–77 (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783
(1952) and Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104,
108, (1991)).
121
Id.; see also S. REP. No. 106–140, at 4 (1999).
122
Verizon Cal., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1177–78.
123
Id. at 1178.
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raises the bar for imposing liability.124 This heightened standard
fits squarely in the present scenario because for the registrar to be
liable, it is not enough that it is aware of a similar domain name, it
must also know that the domain is registered in bad faith.125 This,
in turn, presents a stricter rule than for contributory trademark
infringement. Although the defendant pointed to legislative history
which indicates that the ACPA was intended to be narrow,
contributory liability is “sufficiently cabined by the ‘exceptional
circumstances’ requirement to prevent the imposition of liability in
contravention of the intent of the statute.”126
In other words, according to the court, no innocent registrar,
irrespective of offering WHOIS-masking and domain parking
services, may be held liable for a registrant’s bad faith domain
name registration.127
IV.

ANALYSIS OF PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD V.
GODADDY.COM, INC.
Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc. was
presented to the Ninth Circuit appellate court by plaintiff-appellant
Petroliam Nasional Berhad (“Petronas”), after the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California granted summary
judgment in favor of registrar GoDaddy.com, holding that the
ACPA did not include a cause of action for contributory
cybersquatting.128 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
One or more “John Does” had registered the domain names
petronastower.net and petronastowers.net with a third party
registrar in 2003. 129 The underlying issue evolved around the
124

Id.
Id. at 1179.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 856 (N.D. Cal.
2012), aff’d, 737 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 13-1255, 2014 WL
1496428 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014).
129
Id. at 548.
125
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Does’ transferal of the domain names to GoDaddy.com in 2007
and subsequent utilization of the GoDaddy.com WHOIS
anonymization service and domain parking service. This allowed
the Does to point the domain names to a pornographic website
hosted by a third party webhost.130
In determining whether the ACPA includes a cause of action
for contributory cybersquatting, the court based its analysis on
three main questions: (1) whether the plain text of the ACPA
provides a cause of action and whether this was Congress’ intent;
(2) whether ACPA created a new and distinct cause of action; and
(3) whether the goals of the ACPA would be advanced by allowing
suits against registrars for contributory cybersquatting.131
A. Is Contributory Cybersquatting Liability Authorized by the
Plain Text of the ACPA?
The court split the question of whether the text of the ACPA
authorizes a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting into
two subcategories, first looking at the text in isolation, and then
analyzing Congress’ intent in enacting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(A)
and 1114(2)(D)(iii).
The court’s first argument is that ACPA does not mention any
forms of secondary liability and merely imposes civil liability for
persons with “bad faith intent to profit” from a protected mark by
“register[ing], traffic[king] in, or us[ing] a domain name.”132 It
reasoned, by extending liability to registrars who are not
themselves cybersquatters, one “would expand the range of
conduct prohibited by the statute from a bad faith intent to
cybersquat on a trademark to the mere maintenance of a domain
name by a registrar, with or without a bad faith intent to profit.”133
The court draws its main argument from Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver and Jack K. Naber, in which the
130

Id.
Id. at 550.
132
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)).
133
Id. at 550–51.
131
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Supreme Court did not accept plaintiff’s assertion of an aiding and
abetting claim under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.134
They held, “[w]e cannot amend the statute to create liability for
acts that are not themselves [prohibited] within the meaning of the
statute.”135 because “when Congress enacts a statute under which a
person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for
the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, there is no
general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and
abettors.”136
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that Congress’ intent could
not have been to include secondary liability by pointing to a
portion of Central Bank of Denver, which implies that Congress
knew of secondary liability and its uses in traditional trademark
law, but actively chose not to add such a provision in the statute.137
Plaintiff-appellant also argued that the language in
§ 1114(2)(D)(iii) indicates that § 1125(d)(1)(A) was intended to
“create a cause of action for secondary liability.”138 In analyzing
this argument, the court looked at the statute and concluded the
specific § 1114(2)(D)(iii) “applies only to ‘this section,’” while
§ 1114 “sets out remedies for the entire Lanham Act.”139
134

Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 177–78 (1994) (“The issue, however, is not whether imposing private
civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but whether aiding and
abetting is covered by the statute;” . . . “The proscription does not include giving
aid to a person who commits a manipulative or deceptive act.”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b).
135
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177–78.
136
Id. at 182.
137
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 551; Pub. L. No. 106–113 (citing Cent. Bank, 511
U.S. at 178 (“Congress knew how to impose [secondary] liability when it chose
to do so.”)).
138
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 551.
139
Id.; U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii) (“A domain name registrar, a domain name
registry, or other domain name registration authority shall not be liable for
damages under this section for the registration or maintenance of a domain name
for another absent a showing of bad faith intent to profit from such registration
or maintenance of the domain name.” (emphasis added)).
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Finally, the court concluded that legislative history shows that
§ 1114(2)(D)(iii) was intended to “codify the protection granted
[to] registrars in Lockheed Martin Corp.” 140 This was because
Lockheed Martin Corp. “considered secondary liability of
registrars for trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a).” 141 The court could thus not find anything that
suggested intent from Congress to include “a cause of action for
contributory cybersquatting” in § 1125(d).142
B. A New and Distinct Course of Action
The Ninth Circuit did not agree with the previous district court
cases, or plaintiff-appellant, that Congress incorporated “the
common law of trademark, including contributory infringement,
into the ACPA.”143 The court once again relied on Central Bank of
Denver which stated that there is “no general presumption that the
plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors” when Congress enacts
tort statutes relating to private defendants. 144 The court also
disagreed with plaintiff-appellant’s argument, presuming that there
must be statutory purpose to the contrary of long-established and
familiar principles before deviating from the common law.145
The court recognized that courts may infer a cause of action
where “circumstances suggest that Congress intended to
140

Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 551.
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 106–140 at 11; Lockheed Martin Corp., 141 F.
Supp. 2d at 655 (“The bill, as amended, also promotes the continued ease and
efficiency users of the current registration system enjoy by codifying current
case law limiting the secondary liability of domain name registrars and registries
for the act of registration of a domain name.”)).
142
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 551.
143
Id.; Verizon California, Inc. 881 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1176–79 (C.D. Cal.
2011); Microsoft Corp. v. Shah, No. 10–0653, 2011 WL 108954, at *1–*3
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011); Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp.
2d 1092, 1111–12 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc.,
177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 646–47 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
144
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182 (1994)).
145
Id.
141
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incorporate common law principles into a statute.”146 However, the
court was not able to find such “circumstances” in this case.147 The
differences between traditional Lanham Act claims and ACPA
claims separate the ACPA from the accumulated common law that
the Lanham Act is based upon.148 This is because the court read
the ACPA as a “new statutory cause of action” created “to address
a new problem: cybersquatting.”149 The purpose of the statute was,
in other words, distinct from traditional trademark law because
traditional trademark law “only restricts commercial use of
another’s protected mark in order to avoid consumer confusion as
to the source of a particular product.” 150 Since the trademark
owner must prove “bad faith” to find cybersquatting liability, “no
analogous requirement exists for traditional trademark claims.”151
The court further draws analogy to actions established by the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which the Ninth
Circuit found to not be necessarily subject to the “same defenses
available to traditional copyright claims.”152
C. Furtherance of the Statute’s Goals
The court next looked at the legislative history, which states
that the ACPA was enacted to “protect consumers . . . and to
provide clarity in the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the
bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks.” 153 The
court’s interpretation of the Senate report was that the ACPA was
“carefully and narrowly tailored” with the purpose to fix the
146

Id.
Id.
148
Id. at 553.
149
Id. at 552 (citing S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7) (noting that “[c]urrent law
does not expressly prohibit the act of cybersquatting”).
150
Id.; see generally New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d
302, 305–06 (9th Cir. 1992); Bosley, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2005).
151
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552–53.
152
Id.; MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 948 n.10
(9th Cir. 2011).
153
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553 (citing S. REP. No. 106–140, at 4).
147
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specific problem of cybersquatting.154 This view is strengthened by
looking at the actual limitations included in the Act, namely the
requirement for bad faith,155 and the narrow definition of who
“uses” a domain name. 156 By broadening the Act to impose
secondary liability, the scope of the Act would expand to a level
that would “seriously undermine both these limiting provisions.”157
The previous district court cases remedied this issue by
requiring a plaintiff to show “exceptional circumstances.”158 The
Ninth Circuit did not accept this solution, as it has “no basis in
either the Act, or in the common law of trademark. Rather than
attempt to cabin a judicially discovered cause of action for
contributory cybersquatting with a limitation created out of whole
cloth, we simply decline to recognize such a cause of action in the
first place.” 159 The last argument the court presented was the
consideration of efficiency, specifically that the ACPA
cybersquatting provision requires subjective bad faith, and the
application of direct liability “spares neutral third party service
providers from having to divine the intent of their customers.”160 It
154

S. REP. No. 106–140, at 12–13.
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 546, 553; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“A
person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard
to the goods or services of the parties, that person—has a bad faith intent to
profit from that mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark
under this section[.]” (emphasis added)).
156
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B) (2012) (“In determining whether a person
has a bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider
factors such as, but not limited to--”); § 1125(d)(1)(D) (“A person shall be liable
for using a domain name under subparagraph (A) only if that person is the
domain name registrant or that registrant’s authorized licensee.”) (emphasis
added).
157
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553.
158
Id.; Verizon California, Inc. v. Above.com Pty Ltd., 881 F.Supp.2d 1173,
1180 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Microsoft Corp v. Shah, No. C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL
108954, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011); Ford Motor Co. v.
Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F.Supp.2d 635, 647 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
159
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553.
160
Id.
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is thus more efficient to analyze a registrant’s subjective intent in
relation to each domain, rather than having big corporations such
as GoDaddy.com having to screen each registration.161
The court regarded the ACPA’s explicitly listed remedies
(excluding contributory liability) as sufficient for the purposes of
fighting cybersquatting. 162 This is strengthened by the in rem
provision, which under certain conditions allows the trademark
holder to sue the domain instead of the registrant in personam.163
Trademark holders may also bring traditional or secondary
trademark infringement claims that arise from cybersquatting
activities.164
V.
IS THE PETROLIAM DECISION CORRECT?
The Ninth Circuit did indeed take the safe route by remaining
well within the literal text of the ACPA, leaving the future of
contributory cybersquatting liability in the hands of Congress or
the Supreme Court.
Interestingly, the district courts in Ford Motor Co., Solid Host,
Microsoft Corp., and Verizon California dared to do much more.
One can easily reason that Congress would—and should
have—included a secondary liability provision within the ACPA if
that was its intent. This argument, however, is not immediately
persuasive, because as the Ninth Circuit stated, the ACPA was
enacted to address a specific problem that the current Lanham Act
was unable to deal with. The issue of cybersquatting obviously did
not exist before the enactment of the Lanham Act; in fact, it was
not an issue until the 1990’s when the modern DNS caught on with
the general public. Intellectual property laws are made to protect
an industry segment that is constantly evolving. New technology
often outrun statutory definitions. This is abused by infringers.
161

Id. (referencing that GoDaddy.com’s registrants holds over 50 million
domains).
162
Id.
163
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2012).
164
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553.
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Every tool available should be used to find an equitable solution. If
relevant common law exists, it should not simply be discarded, but
interpreted with the statute, in light of the dynamic technical
landscape. The ACPA is a tool for trademark owners to stop
cybersquatting; it gives courts the necessary authority to cancel or
transfer the domain names to the trademark owners in situations
where the registrant is not acting in commerce. The courts cannot
allow themselves to look away from the massive trademark
common law just because of this technicality. The fact that the in
rem provision and the UDRP procedures are very effective in
combating direct cybersquatting is not reason enough to deny the
application of secondary liability where the contributor has had an
active role in the primary cybersquatting activity.
A. The Plain Text of ACPA
The ACPA, like the Lanham Act for traditional trademarks,
does not contain any explicit text for contributory liability. With
regard to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A), the Petroliam appellate court
emphasized that by holding registrars accountable, the “range of
conduct prohibited by the statute from a bad faith intent to
cybersquat on a trademark to the mere maintenance of a domain
name by a registrar, with or without bad faith intent to profit”
would be too substantial an expansion of the statute. 165 This
interpretation is too restrictive. If anything, the district court’s
interpretation follows a strict standard in which registrars, who are
not acting in bad faith, cannot be held liable. Another issue with
the Ninth Circuit’s justification is that its primary source is Central
Bank of Denver, in which the Supreme Court stated that “Congress
knew how to impose [secondary] liability when it chose to do
so.” 166 Central Bank of Denver involves a different issue: the
general antifraud provision in the Securities Exchange Act
(“SEA”) § 10(b). This provision presents substantially different
165

Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114
S.Ct. 1439, 1148 (1994).
166
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considerations than trademark law. 167 Trademark law, unlike
securities law, is designed to protect owners’ trademarks from
being misrepresented to the relevant consumer base.
In examining the enactment of the Lanham Act back in 1946,
why did the courts not end up with a similar result as in Central
Bank of Denver when discussing the application of traditional
contributory trademark infringement? The Inwood court did find
contributory trademark infringement, even though the Lanham Act
did not expressly justify its application. The short answer is that
substantial common law supported such application. Substantial
common law background was not an issue in Central Bank of
Denver. To that, the Ninth Circuit argues contributory
cybersquatting liability involves a new and distinct course of
action.168
As for the Ninth Circuit’s discussion regarding
§ 1114(2)(D)(iii), the Ninth Circuit’s justification is principally
correct. The provision clearly states “under this section,” but that
only excludes § 1114(2)(D)(iii) specific applicability, as the Ninth
Circuit infers that this is an argument against applying secondary
liability in cybersquatting cases, the provision just as much proves
the opposite. Neither § 1114(2)(D)(iii) or any other provision in
the Lanham Act expressly denies the applicability of contributory
liability. It is unclear why the section should be treated in isolation
from the rest of the section. The provision is not in a vacuum; it
indirectly shows Congress’ intent and consideration of applying
secondary liability in certain scenarios.
It makes sense to apply the provision analogically to situations
that are not mentioned in the provision. For example, it should
apply to situations where the registrars’ primary functions go
beyond registration or maintenance of domain names. The
registrars’ safe harbor is intended for actions made as a registrar
and not for profit-generating side businesses such as
167
168

15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2012).
See infra Part V.B.
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WHOIS-masking and domain parking services. Furthermore, the
provision clearly states that the registrars indeed are liable for
registration and maintenance of domain names if found to have had
“bad faith intent.” This shows Congress’ clear intent of holding
dishonest registrars liable.
B. New and Distinct Course of Action
The appellant-defendant relied on Inwood and the application
of contributory liability for trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act.169 The fact that Congress legislated against this legal
background and placed the ACPA within the Lanham Act, shows
that the intention must have been to include a cause of action for
contributory cybersquatting.170 The appellate court, admitted that
even by relying on Bank of Denver, which infers that there “is no
general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and
abettors,” “courts can infer such a cause of action where
circumstances suggest that Congress intended to incorporate
common law principles into [the Lanham Act].” 171 The Ninth
Circuit however, would not find circumstances regarding the
enactment of the ACPA that supports an argument of Congress’
intent of incorporating theories of secondary liability into that
Act.172 This is because the Ninth Circuit claimed “the ACPA did
not result from the codification of common law, much less
common law that included a cause of action for secondary
liability”; rather the ACPA was created to deal with a new, specific
problem, cybersquatting, and thus created a new statutory cause of

169

Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553.
Id. (citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)) (“Statutes
which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring
the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident.”) (citations omitted).
171
Bank of Denver, 114 S.Ct. at 1451; Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.,
456 U.S. 844, n.2 (1982).
172
Bank of Denver, 114 S.Ct. at 1452.
170
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action.173 The Ninth Circuit supports its decision and relies on both
the substantial history behind the Lanham Act, originating from
English common law, 174 and the law review article The
Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, which states that “the
Lanham Act’s primary, express purpose was to codify the existing
common law of trademarks and not to create any new trademark
rights.”175
The Court claims that the ACPA has distinct purposes that
differ from traditional trademark law, and thus must have distinct
elements.176 The main argument is that traditional trademark law
prohibits commercial acts that infringe on another’s mark in order
to avoid source-identifying consumer confusion. 177 For finding
cybersquatting liability, there is no requirement that the acts be “in
commerce,” but rather there must be “bad faith intent to profit.”178
Since traditional trademark law has no analogous requirement, the
Ninth Circuit concludes that “bad faith intent to profit” is to be
considered a distinct course of action.179
It is hard to argue against the fact that the ACPA is a new
action per se. It is an action created to deal with a new type of
infringement, cybersquatting, which did not exist at the enactment
of the Lanham Act. However, common law is not static. Many
cybersquatters do not act “in commerce” as there is no requirement
for registrants to act in commerce to register domains (unlike for
173

Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552 (citing S. REP. No. 106–140, at 7 (“noting that
‘[c]urrent law does not expressly prohibit the act of cybersquatting’”)).
174
Id.; see also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1115, 1122
(2003).
175
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552 (citing Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of
Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 519, 520 (1993)).
176
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552.
177
Id.; see also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302,
305–06 (9th Cir.1992); Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680
(9th Cir. 2005).
178
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B) (2012) (stating a
person is “liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark” if that person has a
“bad faith intent to profit from that mark”).
179
Petroliam, 717 F.3d at 553.
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registering trademarks). It is also much cheaper and easier to
register multiple domain names, unlike trademarks. 180 For
example, a person, not acting in commerce, who registers a
dot-com domain of a famous mark, and subsequently points the
domain to explicit and obscene pornographic materials would be
regarded as tarnishing and/or diluting the mark. Why should
liability not be imposed on him, when his friend who acts in
commerce (such as selling such merchandise across state borders)
could be held liable?
The fact that the ACPA implements liability on “bad faith”
instead of “in commerce” does not necessarily create a new cause
of action. It rests on the same fundamental foundations, to protect
the consumer from confusion as to the source of goods or services.
“Bad faith” in the cybersquatting context infers a will to profit
from the domain, similarly to someone “acting in commerce.” The
addition of the ACPA is merely a tool for the courts to be able to
incur liability of cybersquatters without running afoul with the
general wording of the Lanham Act, which was enacted almost
seventy years ago.
C. Furtherance of the Statute’s Goals
The Ninth Circuit claims that the legislative history and the Act
in itself entail a narrow interpretation that precludes cybersquatting
secondary liability. By looking at the Act in isolation, the analysis
above shows that it warrants an expansive and analogic
interpretation.181 In analyzing the Senate Report, it is also difficult
to support the Ninth Circuit’s argument. The Report states that:
The bill is carefully and narrowly tailored, however, to extend only to
cases where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant registered,
trafficked in, or used the offending domain name with bad-faith intent
to profit from the goodwill of a mark belonging to someone else. Thus,
180

An interesting side note could be made towards regulation of the .no
(Norwegian country code TLD), which until June 1, 2014 required every
registrant to provide an organization number in order to register domain names.
A direct result of this was that all registrants acted in commerce.
181
See supra Part V.A.
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the bill does not extent [sic] to innocent domain name registrations by
those who are unaware of another’s use of the name, or even to
someone who is aware o the trademark status of the name but registers
a domain name containing the mark for any reason other than with bad
faith intent to profit from the goodwill associated with that mark.182

Congress’ aim with this is to limit the application to the
registrant’s bad faith registration. It is “carefully and narrowly”
tailored in the sense that registrants who are not registering the
domain name in bad faith should not be liable. It does not address
excluding secondary liability as the Ninth Circuit claims. The goal
of the statute is to provide the courts an effective tool against
cybersquatters (people not acting in commerce), who act with bad
faith intent to profit on other’s marks. The Act is “carefully and
narrowly” tailored to not catch people registering domain names in
good faith. That is it.
It is counterintuitive to presume that registrars knowingly
contributing to primary cybersquatting activity get carte blanche to
do so, by the mere fact that Congress has stated people registering
domain names in good faith are outside of the ACPA’s scope.
In an effort to harmonize the ACPA with traditional trademark
infringement rules, the district courts in Verizon California,
Microsoft Corp., and Ford Motor Co. required a showing of
“exceptional circumstances.” 183 The Ninth Circuit claims the
exceptional circumstance test “has no basis in either the Act, or in
the common law of trademark.”184 Both the ACPA and Lanham
Act are mute about contributory liability, so it is not sensible for
Congress to have included the words “exceptional circumstances.”
It is also strange that the Court would mention the common law of
trademark, as it already concluded the ACPA is a new and distinct
course of action, rending the common law of trademarks irrelevant.
182

S. REP. No. 106-140, at 12–13.
See Verizon California, Inc. v. Above.com Pty Ltd., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1173,
1178 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Microsoft Corp v. Shah, No. C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL
108954, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011) ; Ford Motor Co. v.
Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp.2d 635, 647 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
184
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The separation of powers dictates that it is up to Congress to
enact laws. A federal court may not lightly create common law
rights; it must exercise its authority to fill interstitial gaps to
effectuate the statutory pattern enacted by Congress.185 The Ford
Motor Co. and Solid Host “exceptional circumstance” test is a way
to fill an interstitial gap. It was clear that Namecheap sufficiently
monitored and controlled its services, but for the court not to
exceed its powers and overstep Congress’ intent Namecheap would
have to positively know that the domain had been stolen before
placing contributory liability. This fits well into the realm of
traditional trademark infringement and the Lanham Act because it
aligns analogically with Inwood and the 20-plus years of decisions
finding contributory trademark infringement without intervention
by Congress. Namecheap continued to supply the anonymity
service, even though it knew it was being used to cybersquat. The
considerations are inherently similar.
The Ninth Circuit asserts, “[l]imiting claims under the Act to
direct liability is also consistent with the ACPA’s goal of ensuring
that trademark holders can acquire and use domain names without
having to pay ransom money to cybersquatters.”186 The last part of
the statement is sensible. The ACPA’s main purpose and weight
rests on the ability for mark owners to get squatted domain names
returned or cancelled. However, this does not exclude the assertion
of secondary liability of registrars acting outside of the core
registrar services (such as registering and maintaining domain

185

See Hooven v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 465 F.3d 566, 573 n.5 (3rd Cir. 2006);
see also Donald L. Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in the “New Erie” Canal,
1990 UTAH L. REV. 759, 761 (1990) (“The Article concludes with the
suggestion that federal courts have considerable common law powers, which,
rather than being inconsistent with separation of powers, actually function to
make exercises of congressional power more effective. Separation of powers is
not offended when federal courts create common law, provided that these efforts
are constrained by expressions of policy in positive law, the Constitution and
federal statutes.”).
186
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553.
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names)187 and that are aware of and contribute to cybersquatting
activity. The interests of registrars should not preempt a mark
owner’s right to pursue contributory infringing activity.
This Article does not demand that registrars “have to divine the
intent of their customers,” but rather to be attentive when receiving
notification of cybersquatting activity by mark owners. 188
Although different in many key aspects, primarily by the fact the
Act clearly authorize its applicability, one may look to the DMCA
limitations on liability relating to material online, which
indemnifies service providers for hosting infringing materials
when promptly removing the infringing material upon discovery or
notification.189 The Ninth Circuit’s fears of imposing registrars to
“trademark and domain name disputes” is simply not realistic by
the heightened standard set by the “exceptional circumstance”
test.190
VI.
CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is intriguing, and on many levels
persuasive. It remains well within the literal letter of the statute,
leaving the matter for the Supreme Court or Congress to decide.
The Ninth Circuit has done its job well within its discretion, so
why argue against its holding?
The Supreme Court in Brown v. Duchesne, in 1856, stated “it is
well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court will not look
merely to a particular clause in which general words may be
used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute . . . and
the objects and policy of the law.”191 This principle was further
elaborated in Bob Jones which made it clear that “[i]t is a
well-established canon of statutory construction that a court should
go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that
187

See also 15 U.S.C. § 1114(D)(iii) (2012) (safe harbor provision).
Id.
189
17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (2012).
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Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553.
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language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute.”192 Both
the objectives and policy considerations behind the ACPA and the
Lanham Act conform to an expanded interpretation in support of
contributory cybersquatting liability.
Although the Ninth Circuit abstained from discussing the
“exceptional circumstance” test in Petroliam, the registrar acted
less culpably than in Solid Host and Microsoft Corp., this suggests
that any reasonable court, by applying the “exceptional
circumstance” test, might have found GoDaddy.com not liable for
contributory cybersquatting. The Court’s wording in Petroliam
effectively removed any hope for mark owner to get remedy
against registrars contributing to cybersquatting in the Ninth
Circuit. As discussed in Part V, this is unreasonably strict,
considering the reason for imposing such secondary liability.
It is easy to imagine situations where a registrar should be held
accountable for contributing to cybersquatting. The harm done to a
famous trademark, such as by directing unknowing consumers to
pornographic and other obscene websites, can be massive. This
loss, in many cases, cannot be recovered from the primary
cybersquatter as either in personam jurisdiction is unobtainable, or
the defendant simply lacks the funds to cover profits, damages and
legal costs, 193 or the maximum of $100,000 of statutory
damages.194
The threshold for imposing liability should be high, but
present, so as to function as a motivator for registrars to avoid
actively contributing to cybersquatting. Registrars conducting their
regular core businesses, such as registering domain names and
maintaining their records should never lead to liability.195 For a
registrar to risk secondary cybersquatting liability a plaintiff should
have to prove that: (1) someone registered a domain name with
“bad faith intent to profit;” (2) the domain name registrar is acting
192

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983).
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012).
194
Id. § 1117(d).
195
See id. § 1114(D)(iii) (2012).
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outside of its core functions of registering and maintaining domain
names, as by offering services such as WHOIS-masking or domain
forwarding; and (3) the existence of “exceptional circumstances.”
Such circumstances might be the registrar actively inducing the
cybersquatting activity, such as by marketing services that helps
the cybersquatters more efficiently squat on domains and
trademarks alike, as seen in Microsoft Corp.196 It might also entail
more passive contribution or facilitation, such as hiding the
cybersquatter’s identity by publishing the cybersquatter’s own
information in the WHOIS record rather than the registrant’s.
There should be no passive contribution, unless the situation of
offering such services would have led a normal and prudent person
to conclude that the domain in question was squatted. This Essay
does not contend that services going outside the scope of
registering and maintaining domain names should automatically be
viewed as bad faith or unlawful. Both WHOIS-masking and
domain forwarding are practical tools that primarily serve
legitimate purposes. As such, a registrar should only be liable
when sufficiently notified by a mark owner of specific illicit use.
The Ninth Circuit rests its holding on efficiency considerations,
namely that the ACPA cybersquatting provision requires
subjective bad faith, and the application of direct liability “spares
neutral third party service providers from having to divine the
intent of their customers.”197 The Court uses the words “neutral
third party,” but how can the cases as analyzed above, and the
above several hypotheticals signify a “neutral third party”?
Admittedly, the registrars act in varying levels of involvement and
guilt, but it must be underlined that registrars very well may
behave directly culpably and should be held contributorially liable.
Major registrars such as GoDaddy.com have already
implemented steps to counter the likelihood of secondary
cybersquatting liability when offering services such as
196

See Microsoft Corp v. Shah, No. C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL 108954, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011).
197
Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 553.
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WHOIS-masking and sponsored domain-parking services by
including various provisions in their service agreements. The
GoDaddy.com’s Domain Name Proxy Agreement authorizes
GoDaddy.com to disclose personal information to “[r]esolve any
and all third party claims, whether threatened or made, arising out
of [the registrants] use of a domain name for which [GoDaddy.com
subsidiary company, Domains By Proxy, LLC] is the registrant
listed in the “Whois” directory on [the registrant’s] behalf.”198 As
for sponsored domain parking, which GoDaddy.com calls
“Cashparking,” GoDaddy.com clearly states in its Service
Agreement that they “reserve the right to screen domain names
prior to enrollment and . . . may exclude, in [its] sole discretion,
any domain name for any reason, including, but not limited to: a)
violation of this Agreement or the Universal Terms of Service; or
b) infringement, or potential infringement, of a third party
intellectual property right.”199 GoDaddy.com, in its various service
agreements, refers to their general trademark policies that list an
email address to contact to claim a trademark violation and
GoDaddy.com’s subsequent investigation procedures. This shows
a great willingness to take trademark infringement and
cybersquatting seriously and to find progressive solutions when
available, without the mark owner having to initiate UDRP or
ACPA proceedings against the direct cybersquatter or the domain
in rem. This depicts a substantially different image than the Ninth
Circuit portrays in Petronas.
GoDaddy.com’s license agreements are a progressive example
of how registrars can avoid secondary cybersquatting liability
altogether. It shows how little effort it takes. As mentioned above,
198

See Domain Name Proxy Agreement Section 4.ii, GODADDY
http://www.godaddy.com/agreements/showdoc.aspx?pageid=DOMAIN_NAME
PROXY (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
199
See CASHPARKING® SERVICE AGREEMENT Section 2 GODADDY
https://in.godaddy.com/agreements/ShowDoc.aspx?se=%2B&pageid=Cash_Par
k_SA (last visited Aug. 29, 2015) (emphasis added) (Cashparking is basically a
default site provided by GoDaddy.com when registering domain names that
contains advertisements whereas the registrant is paid based on traffic).
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the inherent justification behind trademark law is the protection of
consumers. By helping or inducing cybersquatters to make money
by sponsored domain parking services, it is ultimately the
consumer who loses both time and money trying to navigate to the
correct website. Another loser is the mark owners, who have to
police their marks and spend considerable amount of money
towards UDRP proceedings and federal court proceedings. The
additional cost imposed by the registrars’ services such as domain
masking and sponsored domain parking ultimately shifts to the
consumer, as the product cost is increased as a measure to offset
the policing cost.
It is only fair that some of this cost is transferred to the
registrars who choose to go outside of the core services such as
registering and maintaining domain names.
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